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ARTICLE
Gregory Bischoping
Reconceiving Ethics for Judicial Law Clerks
Abstract. Judicial law clerks hold a unique and critical position in our legal
system. They play a central part in the functioning of the judiciary, oftentimes
writing the first draft of their judge’s opinions and serving as their trusted
researcher and sounding board. Moreover, they are privy to the many highly
confidential processes and private information behind the important work of
the judiciary. It stands to reason the comprehensive set of ethical duties that
bind the world of lawyers and judges should also provide guidance for judicial
law clerks. The most important among those ethics rules is a duty of
confidentiality. Without such a rule, after one’s clerkship, nothing enforces the
commonly known duty. It is difficult to study the extent to which chambers’
confidences are breached in the practice of law, but books like The Brethren
reveal the ways clerks have shared confidential judicial details with the public.
Even the well-intentioned clerks, who make up the overwhelming majority, are
given little to no guidance on the types of information they may ethically
disclose. And there are other areas where guidance would be beneficial, such
as post-clerkship recruiting and the limits on partisanship behavior during the
clerkship.
During the clerkship, when clerks are bound by the judiciary’s
comprehensive guidance, they have limited ability to differentiate between that
which is a contractual obligation and that which is a professional responsibility.
Such line drawing is an important exercise in the practice of law, which is
founded on an underlying lattice of professional ethics. After the clerkship,
they are bound to the judiciary by little more than their personal sense of
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responsibility and non-enforceable guidance. This Article will recommend that
state bar associations consider providing additional guidance to law clerks,
particularly by promulgating a rule establishing a duty of confidentiality to the
judiciary following one’s clerkship.
Author. Gregory Bischoping, J.D., earned his law degree from University
of Pennsylvania Law School and earned a Bachelor of Science from Boston
College. He is a former clerk to the United States District Court for the
District of Delaware and the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit. Mr. Bischoping had the incredibly good fortune of clerking for
two thoughtful, supportive, and brilliant judges. He is currently an associate at
Munger, Tolles & Olson, LLP. All opinions expressed herein are held by him
exclusively in his individual capacity and should be interpreted as his reflection
on systemic ethical structures supporting the United States Judiciary.
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I. INTRODUCTION: WHY WE SHOULD RECONCEIVE CLERKSHIP ETHICS
This Article will argue that the ethics model for federal term law clerks is
inadequate. This is not a criticism of the judiciary’s continued efforts to
encourage ethical behavior. It is, however, a critique of the very concept of
a contractual, temporary, and relationship-based ethics model, which runs
counter to the ethos of our profession. Clerkship ethics are generally
grounded in contractual duties owed to the judiciary,1 personal respect for
one’s judge, and a desire to protect one’s professional reputation. In
practice, these forces almost always compel ethical behavior during the
clerkship, and usually foster ethical behavior post-clerkship, but this is not
universally true.2 Former clerks are bound by few enduring professional

1. See, e.g., FED. JUD. CTR., MAINTAINING THE PUBLIC TRUST: ETHICS FOR FEDERAL
JUDICIAL LAW CLERKS 1 (4th ed. 2018), https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/materials/35/
Maintaining_the_Public_Trust_Revised_4th_Edition_Public_2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/NE3D58T7] (“[Law clerks] also need to familiarize [themselves] with and follow [their] judge’s ethical
guidelines. These guidelines may differ from chambers to chambers.”).
2. Every so often, stories of especially outrageous behavior by current or former law clerks,
either in their official or personal capacity, catch national attention. See Parker B. Potter, Jr., Law Clerks
Gone Wild, 34 SEATTLE U.L. REV. 173, 184 (2010) (describing instances where law clerks broke the
rules and wound up appearing in a written decision, such as the time a “law clerk convened the court”
in his judge’s absence and read the trial transcript to the jury); see also Lisa Demer, Former Law Clerk
Sentenced to 4 Years for Voyeurism, Child Porn, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS (Apr. 28, 2011),
https://www.adn.com/alaska-news/article/former-law-clerk-sentenced-4-years-voyeurism-child-por
n/2011/04/29/ [https://perma.cc/7K8T-QS9G] (describing sentencing of former federal law clerk
on “indecent viewing and child pornography charges”); George Khoury, Court Clerk Has Sex in Judge’s
Chambers, Sues to Get Job Back, FINDLAW (Mar. 22, 2018, 1:30 PM), https://blogs.findlaw.com/
greedy_associates/2018/03/court-clerk-has-sex-in-judges-chambers-sues-to-get-job-back.html [https:
//perma.cc/F6RL-7CJD] (detailing a law clerk’s punishment for sexual misconduct); David Lat,
A Law Clerk with a Gilded Résumé, Charged with Solicitation and Attempted Rape of a Young Boy, ABOVE THE
L. (Jan. 13, 2014, 11:32 AM), https://abovethelaw.com/2014/01/a-law-clerk-with-a-gilded-resumecharged-with-solicitation-and-attempted-rape-of-a-young-boy/
[https://perma.cc/ZRH8-6F6J]
(listing sexual misconduct allegations “against a former law clerk”); Todd Lighty, Law Clerk in Judge
Impersonation Case Is Charged with a Felony, CHI. TRIB. (Oct. 21, 2016, 6:34 PM), https://www.chicago
tribune.com/news/breaking/ct-law-clerk-arraigned-20161021-story.html [https://perma.cc/6FLFNE6F] (describing a judicial candidate’s misconduct resulting in a false impersonation charge); Jessica
Mendelson, Federal Court Clerk Arrested for Allegedly Sharing Confidential Information with Gangs, SEYFARTH
(Aug. 28, 2012), https://www.tradesecretslaw.com/2012/08/articles/trade-secrets/federal-courtclerk-arrested-for-allegedly-sharing-confidential-information-with-gangs/ [https://perma.cc/HJL5JQ6U] (recounting a law clerk’s involvement with street gangs, including sharing confidential
information).
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rules of behavior and are offered limited guidance on suggested postclerkship behavior.3
I do not suggest changing the current regulations on clerk behavior.4
Instead, I suggest adding a new layer to clerkship ethics: increased guidance
by state bar organizations effectuated through carefully crafted professional
rules of conduct. A new professional rule of ethics for clerks would fill the
gaps in the current system, the most obvious being a continuing duty of
confidentiality toward the judiciary upon completion of a clerkship. The
benefits of a comprehensive professional rule are vast and would work
harmoniously with the current structure. This harmonious system would
protect the integrity of the judiciary, externalize complicated issues of postclerkship regulation, and provide clerks with guidance on the contours of
their professional responsibility; it draws a line in the sand between that
which is a contractual duty to one’s employer—the judiciary—and that
which is a professional responsibility to the bar.
At a fundamental level, not all clerks and former clerks are bound by
traditional ethics rules. Although the legal profession enjoys characterizing
clerks as the hands of the judge,5 this metaphor is not an adequate basis for
ethics policy, nor is it an authoritative basis to hold former clerks
accountable. The profession is built on the principle that lawyers should
develop, abide by, and enforce ethical rules and principles6—clerks can be
no exception. The current model of clerkship ethics is intertwined with
what is seen as a “special relationship” between the clerks and judges.7
Beyond this relationship, clerkship ethics are covered by a “patchwork” of
rules:

3. FED. CIR. R. 50 (placing strict limits on former federal circuit employees, including law
clerks); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.12 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2021); 9TH CIR. R. 46-5.
4. See, e.g., FED. JUD. CTR., supra note 1, at 1 (discussing the “Code of Conduct for Judicial
Employees, which has five canons”).
5. See, e.g., id. (providing “valuable assistance as [a law clerk’s] judge resolves disputes that are of
great importance to the parties, and often to the public”).
6. See, e.g., Henry W. Jessup, The Ethics of the Legal Profession, 101 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. &
SOC. SCI. 16, 16 (1922) (“Law is a double profession. It has an objective and a subjective phase. In its
subjective aspect it possesses a life of the spirit, a high and lofty ethic; higher than the gentleman’s
‘noblesse oblige.’ It is equivalent to the ordination vow of a priest in the temple of Justice. It involves
subjection to self-denying ordinances and domination by a spirit of unselfish service.”).
7. See John Paul Jones, Some Ethical Considerations for Judicial Clerks, 4 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 771,
771–72 (1991) (“[T]he judges enjoying the energies and fresh perspectives of brand new professionals
rated top among their contemporaries by law professors, and the law clerks obtaining tutorials by senior
jurists regarded as among the best by their former peers at the bar.”).
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Once a law clerk has been admitted to the bar, he will be bound by the
standards expressed in his bar’s code of professional responsibility. As the
trusted agent of a judge, a clerk is regarded by some courts as bound by the
judicial standards binding his principal. Law clerks in federal courts are bound
by a code designed particularly for them. Law clerks in some state courts are
expressly charged with adherence to particular local standards, although no
code has yet been developed for general application to the conduct of law
clerks in state courts. These clerks are therefore bound, if at all, only by the
patchwork quilt consisting of bar standards applicable after admission and
bench standards applicable by derivation.8

Clerks that come straight from law school are not members of any state
bar until well-into, or even after, the completion of their clerkship.9 For
these clerks, the Code of Conduct for Judicial Employees serves as a primary
written ethics rules. Interpreting this code, the Federal Judicial Center (FJC)
offers a Clerk’s Handbook with clerkship specific obligations, which
expressly and repeatedly incorporates the individualized wishes of judges.10
This code and handbook constitutes a system of rules determined by one’s
employing organization and cedes substantial power to one’s direct superior;
therefore, such a system of rules should be viewed as contractual obligations
rather than professional ethics.11 Thus, for clerks, contractual and ethical
obligations are one and the same. What we are left with is an incomplete
system: newly minted lawyers are given temporary, contractual, and
8. Id. at 772 (footnotes omitted).
9. Unlike the traditional timing of a clerkship, many judges now prefer clerks with work
experience between law school and the clerkship. See Qualifications, Salary, and Benefits, OSCAR (Feb. 1,
2018), https://oscar.uscourts.gov/qualifications_salary_benefits#qualifications [https://perma.cc/5
N67-42P6] (listing law clerk positions on the “Online System for Clerkship Application and Review”
with salary enhancements for law clerks with work experience); see also Panel Discussion: Judges’ Perspectives
on Law Clerk Hiring, Utilization, and Influence, 98 MARQ. L. REV. 441, 443 (2014) (discussing the
importance of “diversity of life experience” in prospective clerks). But clerkships still occur, to a large
extent, immediately after law school. See Ad Hoc Committee on Law Clerk Hiring Announcement of
Two-Year Pilot Plan dated Feb. 28, 2018, Federal Law Clerk Hiring Plan, 3rd and 4th Pilot Years, OSCAR
(Oct. 2, 2020), https://oscar.uscourts.gov/federal_law_clerk_hiring_pilot [https://perma.cc/9WPRQ9WG] (supporting a proposal for clerkships beginning after the second year of law school at a
minimum as opposed to after the first year of study); Jeffrey B. Abramson, Should a Clerk Ever Reveal
Confidential Information?, 63 JUDICATURE 361, 361 (1980) (“[C]lerkship is a valued interlude between law
school and lawyering, a cap on one’s legal education by way of example set by the judge as tutor.”).
10. See FED. JUD. CTR., supra note 1, at 14, 16, 24, 27–30 (providing examples of clerks being
advised to ask their judge for their specific policy on an ethical question).
11. See id. at 1 (noting a judge may impose restrictions on his law clerk that go beyond the code).
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relationship-based guidance and then expected to engage in self-regulation
before and after departure from the judiciary.
II. THE ETHICS RULES GOVERNING LAW CLERKS
A. Ethics During One’s Clerkship
There is a patchwork of regulations in place that, as a composite, guide
the behavior of federal term law clerks while in chambers.12 During their
one- to two-year term, that patchwork includes respect for one’s judge, state
professional rules (if barred), and the judiciary’s Code of Conduct.
1.

Respect for One’s Judge

Perhaps the most compelling reason to behave ethically is the tremendous
amount of respect felt for one’s judge.13 This respect manifests as a
responsibility to protect the judge’s reputation, a duty to ensure the quality
and integrity of their decisions, and a desire to earn and maintain their trust
and respect. For this reason, the compulsion to approach one’s clerkship
with integrity, confidentiality, and seriousness is internalized by most clerks,
regardless of any written rule.
Born of this respect is the obligation to keep confidential the information
private to the judge, both in their personal life and in their judicial decisionmaking. It is not uncommon for the relationship between judge
and clerk to take on a “personal component.”14 Thus, “[p]reserving the

12. Notably, while this Article will at times incorporate state court clerks into its analyses and
many of the conclusions reached are transferrable to state court clerkships, the Article’s focus will be
on federal clerkships.
13. See Laura B. Bartell, A Splendid Relationship—Judge and Law Clerk, 52 LA. L. REV. 1429, 1429
(1992) (describing with reverence the relationship law clerks held with Judge Alvin B. Rubin); see also
Gary Feinerman, Tribute, Civility, Dignity, Respect, and Virtue, 71 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 140, 140 (2018)
(offering tribute to Justice Kennedy from a former law clerk); Paul Horwitz, Clerking for Grown-Ups: A
Tribute to Judge Ed Carnes, 69 ALA. L. REV. 663, 663, 665 (2018) (describing his desire to write a tribute
to Judge Carnes that is “affectionate, admiring, glowing—almost worshipful[,]” but arguing that “[t]he
tendency of clerks to maintain a lifelong allegiance to their judges, and a lifelong commitment to
burnishing their reputations, has a distorting effect on what ought to be a more mature and
independent and less personality-oriented, worshipful, elite-establishment-oriented legal culture.”
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
14. See Comment, The Law Clerk’s Duty of Confidentiality, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 1230, 1232 (1981)
(first citing Chief Justice Vinson and His Law Clerks, 49 NW. U.L. REV. 26, 26 (1954); then citing Alfred
McCormack, A Law Clerk’s Recollections, 46 COLUM. L. REV. 710, 717 (1946) (describing the clerks as
confidants or friends of the judges they serve)).
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confidentiality of judges’ work [is] ‘an honored tradition among law
clerks.’”15
Because of their position, clerks have a unique view of their judges and other
court personnel. They also have access to opinion drafts, internal
memoranda, and information gleaned from discussions with judges, none of
which are made public once a decision is reached. Prior to announcement of
a decision, the clerk may have information concerning the scheduling of a case
and its probable or certain outcome. Clerks who develop close personal
relationships with their judges also may be aware of the judges’ political
philosophies or personal feelings about particular lawyers, litigants, other
judges, or cases.16

A breach of such confidentiality would no doubt imperil the sanctity of
the judicial system and weaken the substantial trust judges place in their
clerks. In 1980, a survey was distributed to 375 state and federal judges.17
Of the 111 judges who participated, a majority responded that a breach of
confidentiality would cause “a negative impact on the closeness of the
relationship or on the range and type of discussions with clerks.”18
Although highly compelling for most clerks, personal loyalty and respect are
inadequate bases for a constitutionally significant ethical obligation. First,
“[t]he only sanctions are a guilty conscience, disapproval, discharge, or a
potentially negative impact on future employment opportunities if a breach
is publicized.”19 Further, the duty is unreliable and internal: individuals
have differing understandings of what such loyalty demands, and clerks’
closeness with their respective judges may vary dramatically. Additionally,
some commentators have criticized the legal profession’s idealized vision of
the judge-clerk relationship.20
15. Comment, supra note 14, at 1230 (quoting Eugene A. Wright, Observations of an Appellate
Judge: The Use of Law Clerks, 26 VAND. L. REV. 1179, 1189 n.38 (1973)).
16. Id. at 1235.
17. Id. at 1263.
18. Id. at 1237, 1263.
19. Id. at 1244; see also COMM. ON CT. ADMIN. AND CASE MGMT., JUD. CONF. OF THE U.S.,
CIVIL LITIGATION MANAGEMENT MANUAL 145 (2d ed. 2010) (noting “Law Clerks have no statutorily
defined duties, and therefore you have great discretion in what you assign to them”).
20. See Horwitz, supra note 13, at 667–68, 673, 675 (noting multiple problematic results of the
judge-clerk dynamic, including: (1) that “[former clerks] may absorb, and perpetuate, the system and
the pathways that were responsible for their own clerkships rather than stand outside and critique
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Critics have alternatively conceived a judicial clerk’s personal loyalty as a
“derivative duty” because “judicial clerks are the trusted agents of judges
and . . . their conduct reflects on the judge,” who is required “to act both
professionally and ethically.”21 Under this conception, the clerk is seen as
an appendage of the judge and thus infused with at least a portion of their
ethical and professional obligations, such as those described in the model
judicial canons of behavior.22 Indeed, clerks often act on behalf of the judge
in a manner resembling that of an agent. But such a conception is flawed
for multiple reasons. First, Article III power exists solely in the judge, not
the clerk, so it would be wrong to suggest the same ethical rules apply.
Further, the constitutional mechanisms that enforce ethics for federal
judges—a sworn oath and impeachment for violations thereof—are
inapplicable to clerks, especially former clerks.23 If clerks are derivatively
them[,]” which “contributes to a certain degree of immaturity in the American legal profession and
culture[;]” (2) the entrenchment of ideological kinship between clerk and judge; and (3) the
perpetuation of “our credential-obsessed profession[.]”); see also Nancy Gertner, Essay, Sexual
Harassment and the Bench, 71 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 88, 88 (2018) (describing how “[t]he #MeToo
movement has cast all employment settings in a new, more critical light, including the judiciary”); Erin
Coe, EEOC’s Lipnic on Sexual Harassment in the Courthouse, LAW360 (Apr. 16, 2019, 9:40 PM),
https://www.law360.com/articles/1150616/eeoc-s-lipnic-on-sexual-harassment-in-the-courthouse
[https://perma.cc/WJP9-A4FB] (discussing a task force report on abuse in the judiciary and “a cultural
awakening and reckoning on this issue”); Catherine Crump, Clerkships Are Invaluable for Young Lawyers.
They Can Also Be a Setup for Abuse., WASH. POST (DEC. 15, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/posteverything/wp/2017/12/15/when-women-law-clerks-are-harassed-they-often-have-nowh
ere-to-turn/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.22148b0790ea
[https://perma.cc/GS4D-BKFM]
(describing a culture of “worshipful silence”); Andrew Strickler, Judiciary’s Integrity Chief Talks Improving
Workplace Culture, LAW360 (Apr. 16, 2019, 8:29 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1150406/
judiciary-s-integrity-chief-talks-improving-workplace-culture [https://perma.cc/5PFW-LSTW] (“One
of the common criticisms of the judicial complaint process is a near total dearth of public information
about allegations made against judges.”).
21. JENNIFER L. SHEPPARD, IN CHAMBERS: A GUIDE FOR JUDICIAL CLERKS AND EXTERNS
47 (2012) (quoting Jones, supra note 7); see also Amany Ragab Hacking, WOW! What a Clerkship! How
to Maximize Law Students’ Judicial Externships by Jumpstarting the Classroom Experience, LAW.DU.EDU,
https://www.law.du.edu/documents/externships-7/Friday-145/Ragab-Hacking-Conf-Judicial-Prese
ntation.pdf [https://perma.cc/7A3L-PZQ6] (“Law clerks and externs are essentially an extension of
the judge.”).
22. See MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT CANONS 1–4 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020) (listing the
model judicial canons of behavior); see generally 2A JUD. CONF., GUIDE TO JUDICIARY POLICY: CODE
OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES CH. 2 (2019), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/
files/code_of_conduct_for_united_states_judges_effective_march_12_2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/
2TJ7-DC6C] [hereinafter CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES] (providing detailed
explanations of the model judicial canons of behavior).
23. Before reaching impeachment, the judiciary will usually conduct an internal investigation.
The Special Committee on Judicial Ethics is empowered to investigate allegations of misconduct and
report findings to the Circuit Judicial Council, which may then institute certain corrective measures
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bound by the same duties as judges, then comparable investigative or
enforcement procedures should attach to those duties, which they do not.24
Additionally, federal judges are restricted by much more than sanctions
from the judiciary or impeachment: “Judge Arnold often stated that the
judiciary must have the ‘continuing consent of the governed,’ in order to do
its job[,]”25 a restrictive force holding much less power over a term law
clerk. Moreover, it is the judge’s name that attaches to the opinion. A
judge’s stature and respect within the legal community is immensely
important, making their reputational stakes significantly greater than an

against federal judges. Judicial Conduct and Discipline in the United States Federal Courts, FED. JUD. CTR.
(Sept. 17, 2014), https://www.fjc.gov/content/judicial-conduct-and-discipline-united-states-federalcourts-english-original [https://perma.cc/EV2V-LLXE] [hereinafter Judicial Conduct and Discipline].
“Corrective measures by the council may include temporarily suspending case assignments, providing
informal counseling, or issuing censure or reprimand. Action by the Judicial Conference may include
additional corrective measures and, if deemed appropriate, recommendation to the House of
Representatives that the offending judge be impeached.” Id. State judges are bound by the rules of
that state, which may include guidance from the state constitution and state bar. See MODEL RULES
FOR JUD. DISCIPLINARY ENF’T R. 6 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018) (providing a list of possible sanctions for
unethical judicial conduct, usually overseen by the state’s highest court, including removal, suspension,
limitation, reprimand, admonition, or deferred discipline agreement); see also CYNTHIA GRAY, A STUDY
OF STATE JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE SANCTIONS 1 (2002) (ebook) https://www.ncsc.org/__data/
assets/pdf_file/0026/18881/study-of-state-judicial-discipline-sanctions.pdf [https://perma.cc/6SHU
-B5X5] (surveying state judicial discipline systems and providing a framework for judicial discipline).
24. It is worth noting that “[t]here have been only 15 judicial impeachments in U.S. history, and
only eight U.S. judges have been convicted and removed.” Judicial Conduct and Discipline, supra note 23.
Critics have argued the enforcement of judicial misconduct needs improvement, especially in the
context of the #MeToo movement and particularly in state courts. See Nancy L. Sholes, Note, Judicial
Ethics: A Sensitive Subject, 26 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 379, 403 (1992) (suggesting interpretative analysis of
ethical rules to deter judicial misconduct); Aebra Coe, Escape Hatch Remains for Judges Accused of
Misconduct, LAW360 (Apr. 17, 2019, 8:51 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1151097
[https://perma.cc/U9GA-DC3T] (suggesting a judge could step down when faced with potential
misconduct sanctions because rules governing conduct only apply to sitting judges); Erin Coe, Discipline
Rare for State Judges in Sexual Misconduct Cases, Employment Authority, LAW360 (Apr. 15, 2019,
10:10 PM), https://www.law360.com/employment-authority/articles/1149299/discipline-rare-forstate-judges-in-sexual-misconduct-cases [https://perma.cc/FP27-N67S] (“There are lots of different
factors in determining an appropriate sanction.”); Erin Coe, State of Confusion: Wall of Secrecy Surrounds
Sexual Harassment in State Courts, LAW360 (Apr. 16, 2019), https://www.law360.com/articles/
1149753/print?section=aerospace [https://perma.cc/3M6P-6HT2] (“One of the things we’ve learned
from #MeToo is that complaints are often not isolated . . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
25. Stephen B. Burbank, Judicial Independence, Judicial Accountability, & Interbranch Relations,
95 GEO. L.J. 909, 914 (2007) (quoting Richard S. Arnold, From the Bench Judges and the Public, 9 LITIG. 5,
5 (1983)).
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anonymous law clerk.26 Numerous additional forces constrain judicial
behavior,27 which makes this “derivative” conception an inappropriate
doctrine upon which to base clerkship ethics. Lastly, not all clerkships live
up to the idealized vision of mentorship, friendship, and intellectual
transformation, and not all judge-clerk relationships are equally close; thus
making this relationship the basis of an ethical duty may not be fair or
effective for all law clerks.28
2.

State Professional Rules of Conduct

Law clerks, if barred, are bound by the professional rules of the state in
which they are barred.29 As one commentator observed, however:
Two problems arise . . . . First, many clerks are not members of the bar during
their clerkships and therefore would not be bound by the Code. Second, even
for those clerks who are members of the bar, it is unclear whether the judge
can be considered a “client” of the clerk, because the traditional clerk assigned
to a particular judge is employed to assist that judge in performing a public
function rather than to represent his or her personal interests.30

While there are a growing number of clerks with prior legal work experience,
a large portion begin immediately upon graduation from law school and are
26. See, e.g., Nuno Garoupa & Tom Ginsburg, Reputation, Information and the Organization of the
Judiciary, 4 J. COMP. L. 228, 228 (2009) (“Reputation is crucial in many arenas, and judging is no
exception. A judge with a good reputation will enjoy the esteem of his friends and colleagues and may
have chances for advancement to higher courts. If particularly well-known, he or she will have a legacy
that endures long after death . . . .”).
27. See Burbank, supra note 25, at 912 (discussing goals for judicial accountability); Charles G.
Geyh, Rescuing Judicial Accountability from the Realm of Political Rhetoric, 56 CASE W. RSRV. L. REV. 911,
916–17 (2006) (characterizing accountability as an instrumental value promoting distinct ends); see also
Philip L. Dubois, Accountability, Independence, & the Selection of State Judges: The Role of Popular Judicial
Elections, 40 SW. L.J. 31, 49 (1986) (discussing the impact of elections on judicial accountability).
28. See Paul Horwitz, Clerkships Are, or Can Be, Just Jobs. Maybe It’s Better That Way,
PRAWFSBLAWG (Dec. 11, 2017), https://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2017/12/clerkshipsare-or-can-be-just-jobs-maybe-its-better-that-way.html#comments [https://perma.cc/K42Q-QTNZ]
(“Of course, many clerks don’t have this kind of experience. Their clerkship is indeed just a job. It
might be one of the best jobs one ever has, but it is still just a job. And the judge one works for is
clearly one’s boss: not one’s second father or mother, grandfather or grandmother, or friend, or even
necessarily one’s mentor . . . .”).
29. This Article will rely on the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, though each state
has rules that vary from the model rules. See generally MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1–8.5,
1.12 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2021) (providing A.B.A. standards for regulating and maintaining the integrity of
the legal profession).
30. Comment, supra note 14, at 1245–46.
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thus unbarred. For those who are barred, there remains a question of which
rules would apply. Even if the professional rules of behavior are interpreted
to their outermost extreme, the tangible guidance provided to law clerks is
left wanting.
Firstly, clerks are not permitted to work on matters in private practice on
which they worked as clerk, under Rule 1.12. Then, if we assume that a
clerk’s client is some combination of their judge, the judiciary, the
Constitution, and the American public, then certain rules could theoretically
apply. The clerk could have duties related to competence,31 diligence,32
confidentiality,33 conflicts of interest,34 and integrity.35 However, applying
those rules to clerks strains the intent of the Model Rules. How can we
possibly equate an attorney’s relationship with a client to a clerk’s
relationship with the judiciary, a judge, or the public? The relationships are
fundamentally different. This difference causes the type of information we
wish for clerks to keep confidential to also be different and, perhaps, more
restrictive than Rule 1.6 contemplates.36 Even if these model rules were
applied to clerks, their meaning would be vastly different than as applied to
an attorney representing a traditional client, and clerks are left in the dark
on the contextual meaning of the rules.
31. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2021) (“A [clerk] shall
provide competent representation to a client. Competent representation requires the legal knowledge,
skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.”).
32. Id. at R. 1.3 (“A [clerk] shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a
client.”).
33. Id. at R. 1.6.
34. Id. at R. 1.11. Rule 1.11(d)(2)(ii) expressly permits law clerk hiring: “[A] lawyer serving as a
law clerk to a judge, other adjudicative officer or arbitrator may negotiate for private employment as
permitted by Rule 1.12(b) and subject to the conditions stated in Rule 1.12(b).” Id. at R. 1.11(d)(2)(ii).
This subsection does not act as a standalone rule regulating law clerk behavior, but acts as an exception
to the general prohibition against “negotiate[ing] for private employment with any person who is
involved as a party or as lawyer for a party in a matter in which the lawyer is participating personally
and substantially . . . .” Id.
35. Id. at R. 8.4 (providing examples of what constitutes professional misconduct).
36. For instance, even with the informed consent of the parties, information might still be best
kept confidential for the protection of third parties. Id. at R. 1.6(a) (requiring an attorney to obtain a
client’s informed consent to reveal confidential information). Whether a clerk may divulge information
to prevent a crime or fraud seems like a different question than whether a representing attorney may
do so. Id. at R. 1.6(b)(2) (permitting a lawyer to reveal a client’s confidential information under certain
circumstances). Additionally, a clerk should not disclose certain types of personal information about
her judge, even if it is unrelated to any pending case, to avoid parties gaining improper insight into the
functioning of chambers. Id. at R. 1.6.
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The duties of competence, diligence, and integrity are perhaps more
readily applied to clerks.37 Unfortunately, or perhaps fortunately,
competence and diligence are the duties least in need of formalization,
because the clerk’s employer or supervisor can directly monitor her clerks
and mete out discipline for incompetent or negligent work. Rule 8.4
prohibits “conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or
misrepresentation[,]” as well as conduct “that is prejudicial to the
administration of justice[,]”38 and the rule is not limited to the attorneyclient relationship, making it well-suited to govern clerk behavior. However,
Rule 8.4 provides little behavioral guidance within the nuanced ethical
landscape of a federal clerkship.39 It could be useful for sanctioning clearly
malfeasant or dishonest clerks, but it does little to define the contours of a
clerk’s ethical obligations.40 In sum, Rule 8.4 restricts the role of clerks.
Rule 1.12 even more directly limits the ability of former clerks to represent
parties on matters they were privy to as clerks.41 But the vast majority of
rules have limited applicability, providing minimal guidance to a clerk
seeking direction on how to handle complex situations.42 The role of a
code of ethics is as much about providing guidance to the attorney of
integrity as it is about sanctioning the malfeasant attorney.

37. Id. at R. 1.1, 1.3, 8.4.
38. Id. at R. 8.4.
39. Id. at R. 8.4 (listing loosely associated categories of prohibited behavior).
40. One possible, though unprecedented, interpretation of Rule 8.4 would be to infuse the
words “prejudicial to the administration of justice” with the Code of Conduct for Judicial Employees
and the Clerk’s Handbook. Id. at R. 8.4(d). A breach of the Code of Conduct would be a breach of
Rule 8.4. On top of requiring significant interpretation outside its intent, Rule 8.4 thus construed
would still offer limited guidance to clerks post-clerkship, as the judicial code itself predominantly deals
with during-clerkship activities.
41. Rule 1.12(a) places strict limits on some former clerks. See id. at R. 1.12(a) (“[A] lawyer shall
not represent anyone in connection with a matter in which the lawyer participated personally and
substantially as a . . . law clerk” unless they obtain written consent from all parties (emphasis added)).
This rule helpfully governs potential conflicts involving barred former law clerks. It is not, however
comprehensive in its scope, but is limited to preventing a clerk with insider knowledge of a specific
dispute to work on that dispute.
42. Former clerks may find some direction from former employers when attempting to avoid
disqualification from cases due to a conflict. 9TH CIR. R. 46-5 (prohibiting former employees from
participating or assisting in any matters that were pending before the court during their employment,
but allowing an exception for those who show they “had no direct or indirect involvement with the
case”). Cf. infra text accompanying note 108 (highlighting the potential appearance of impropriety in
ungoverned areas).
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A professional rule defining a clerk’s obligations, if drafted properly,
could bind both barred as well as unbarred clerks.43 State bar associations
already regulate the unauthorized practice of law by lawyers not admitted to
practice in that state’s jurisdiction.44 This scope of authority is vast and
seems limited by the governed individual’s desire to practice as a member
of the legal profession.45 It can be assumed that federal clerks place a high
value on authorization to practice law in their jurisdiction of choice,
regardless of whether they are currently barred. State sanctions in the
jurisdiction in which the federal court is located would affect that
authorization and give teeth to a state’s oversight of clerk ethics.
3.

The Federal Code of Conduct for Judicial Employees

Clerks, along with all other judiciary employees, are bound by the Code
of Conduct for Judicial Employees.46 The code contains five canons,
including that “[a] Judicial Employee Should”: (1) “Uphold the Integrity and
Independence of the judiciary and of the Judicial Employee’s Office”;
43. Such a rule fits squarely within the purpose of bar associations “to benefit the general public
by protecting and strengthening the administration of justice, by enhancing public understanding of
and respect for law and legal institutions, and by identifying and advocating needed changes in the law
and opposing those they consider undesirable.” Quintin Johnstone, Bar Associations: Policies and
Performances, 15 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 193, 195–96 (1996).
44. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.5 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2021) (“It is
longstanding law that the conduct of a lawyer admitted to practice in this jurisdiction is subject to the
disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction. Extension of the disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction to
other lawyers who provide or offer to provide legal services in this jurisdiction is for the protection of
the citizens of this jurisdiction.”).
45. State bar association authority to enforce disciplinary action is delegated from the state’s
highest court.
See Professional Discipline, WASH. STATE BAR ASS’N (June 8, 2021),
https://www.wsba.org/for-legal-professionals/professional-discipline
[https://perma.cc/Q3HK9VEC] (indicating the Washington Supreme Court has exclusive authority over the state’s lawyer
disciplinary system). In Delaware, the highest court’s authority can be found “[p]ursuant to the Court’s
inherent power and authority over the regulation of the legal profession . . . .” DEL. LAW.’S R. OF
DISCIPLINARY PROC. R. 1.
46. See 2A JUD. CONF., GUIDE TO JUDICIARY POLICY: CODE OF CONDUCT FOR JUDICIAL
EMPLOYEES CH. 3, § 310.30(a), § 310.30(b) (2019), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/
code_of_conduct_for_judicial_employees_effective_march_12_2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/BK9A6H99] [hereinafter CODE OF CONDUCT FOR JUDICIAL EMPLOYEES] (defining “Member of Judge’s
Personal Staff” as “a judge’s secretary or judicial assistant, a judge’s law clerk, intern, extern, or other
volunteer court employee, and a courtroom deputy clerk or court reporter whose assignment with a
particular judge is reasonably perceived as being comparable to a member of the judge’s personal
staff”).
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(2) “Avoid Impropriety and the Appearance of Impropriety in All
Activities”; (3) “Adhere to Appropriate Standards in Performing the Duties
of the Office”; (4) “In Engaging in Outside Activities, . . . Avoid the Risk of
Conflict with Official Duties, . . . Avoid the Appearance of Impropriety,
and . . . Comply with Disclosure Requirements”; and (5) “Refrain from
Inappropriate Political Activity[.]”47 The Judicial Conference Committee
on Codes of Conduct has published numerous “formal advisory opinions
on ethical issues that are frequently raised or have broad application.”48 A
handful of these opinions provide guidance for common situations law
clerks specifically face, including: situations where a party is represented by
a clerk’s spouse’s law firm;49 a child of the judge wishes to serve as a law
clerk;50 a clerk’s future employer is involved in the case;51 a clerk wishes to
attain a conflicts list of case assignments;52 allowable social media usage;53
and a clerk’s participation in educational seminars.54 There is also an
internal compendium of ethical advisory opinions, but this compendium is
confidential to the judiciary.
For direct and comprehensive advice on their ethical responsibilities, a
clerk turns to Maintaining the Public Trust: Ethics for Federal Judicial Law Clerks,
a handbook promulgated by the FJC explaining how the Code of Conduct
for Judicial Employees applies to law clerks.55 This “Clerk’s Handbook” is
not an independent source of authority, but an interpretation of the five
canons in the Code of Conduct. The thirty-eight page pamphlet contains
sections on: general approaches to an ethics question; confidentiality;
conflicts of interest; political activities, online activities, and gifts;
community activities; and career development.56 The Clerk’s Handbook is
47. See id. § 320 (listing canons of conduct for judicial employees).
48. Published Advisory Opinions, U.S. CTS., https://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/judiciarypolicies/ethics-policies/published-advisory-opinions [https://perma.cc/FP3Z-VPVE].
49. 2B JUD. CONF., GUIDE TO JUDICIARY POLICY: PUBLISHED ADVISORY OPINIONS CH. 2,
No. 51, at 66 (2019), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/vol02b-ch02.pdf [https://perma.
cc/KW5C-F9ZW] [hereinafter GUIDE TO JUDICIARY POL’Y, PUBLISHED ADVISORY OPINIONS].
50. Id. at 88.
51. Id. at 110.
52. Id. at 213.
53. Id. at 224.
54. Id. at 245.
55. See FED. JUD. CTR., supra note 1, at 2 (“To help you get started, the federal judiciary’s ethics
committee, known as the Judicial Conference Committee on Codes of Conduct (the Committee),
prepared this pamphlet in cooperation with the Federal Judicial Center. This pamphlet provides an
overview of your ethical obligations as well as resources you can consult for further information.”).
56. Id. at iii.
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typically assigned on the first day of the clerkship and conveys the
responsibility and ethical duties that attach to the role of the clerk.57 It
provides helpful descriptions of the ethical obstacles a clerk may face,58 with
examples as well as references to outside sources one can look for advice.
The locations a clerk can look to for guidance include: (1) The Code of
Conduct for Judicial Employees; (2) The Ethics Reform Act of 1989 and
regulations promulgated under the Judicial Conference; (3) Judicial
Conference Committee Advisory Opinions on Codes of Conduct; and
(4) the Compendium of Selected Opinions.59
The judiciary’s Code of Conduct, advisory opinions, Clerk’s Handbook,
and confidential compendium, while framed as ethics rules, are best seen as
contractual obligations of judicial employees.60 In fact, formal guidance by
the Advisory Committee notes that “The Code of Conduct for Judicial
Employees applies only to ‘employees of the Judicial Branch,’ not to
prospective employees[,]” and “[a]s with prospective clerks, the Code and
[Section] 7353 do not apply to former clerks[.]”61 Interestingly, the FJC’s
Clerk’s Handbook offers conflicting counsel: “Although many of your
obligations are the same as those of other federal judicial employees, certain
restrictions are more stringent because of your special position in relation to the judge.
Some obligations continue after your service to the court concludes.”62 Specifically, the
handbook reads “[d]uring your clerkship, you will learn a broad range of
confidential information. . . . You have a strict obligation to keep this
information confidential, unless your judge specifically authorizes you to
disclose it. This obligation continues after your court service concludes.”63 This
57. See id. at 1(“Scrupulously follow these canons and the other rules that govern your conduct.
Do not assume that good intentions are enough.”).
58. For instance, the Handbook explains when a clerk is allowed to reference her role in the
court on social media or online activities. See id. at 17 (providing examples of a clerk’s permissible and
impermissible use of social media during a clerkship).
59. See id. at 3 (“The Compendium contains summaries of confidential advice that the
Committee has offered in response to individual inquiries from judges and judicial employees.”).
60. On the U.S. Courts’ website, the Code of Conduct for Judicial Employees is described as
follows: “Employees of the federal Judiciary are expected to observe high standards of conduct so that
the integrity and independence of the Judiciary are preserved and the judicial employee’s office reflects
a devotion to serving the public.” Ethics Policies, U.S. CTS., https://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/
judiciary-policies/ethics-policies [https://perma.cc/NY7U-VR3P].
61. GUIDE TO JUDICIARY POL’Y, PUBLISHED ADVISORY OPINIONS, supra note 49, at 125–26.
62. FED. JUD. CTR., supra note 1 (emphasis added).
63. Id. at 5 (emphasis added).
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statement appears to contradict the judiciary’s formal advisory opinions;
perhaps the FJC sees federal clerks as bound by something more than just
the Code of Conduct for Judicial Employees.64 The most likely
explanation, from the wording of the Clerk’s Handbook and the traditional
understanding of a clerkship, is that the FJC views clerks through the
appendage of the judge framework. As I will discuss, this is an imperfect
basis for a constitutionally imperative ethical obligation. Although the Code
of Conduct for Judicial Employees, with clerk specific guidance, provides a
useful and temporarily binding set of duties, it is not equivalent to or an
adequate substitute for a professional rule of behavior.
B. Ethics After One’s Clerkship
During one’s clerkship term, ethics guidelines are comprehensive.
However, formal advisory opinions tell us the authority behind the Code of
Conduct for Judicial Employees does not continue post (or pre-65)
clerkship. Thus, clerks are left wondering how to treat ethical dilemmas that
emerge later but relate to the clerkship.66 Former clerks can turn to the
64. The Clerk’s Handbook references the continuing obligations once more:
Finally, your ethical obligations impose certain ongoing restrictions that follow you to the next
step in your career. You may not participate in any matter that was pending before your judge
during your clerkship. Your judge may have a policy about whether you may appear before the
judge and, if so, how much time must first elapse. The court for which you clerked may also
place restrictions on your participation and appearance in matters. It may be helpful to check on
these restrictions before your clerkship ends. And, of course, your confidentiality obligations
continue.
Id. at 25; cf. FED. CIR. R. 50 (prohibiting an attorney’s participation in a case when that attorney
is a former employee, such as a law clerk); 9TH CIR. R. 46-5 (excepting prohibited participation in a
case if an attorney shows they did not directly or indirectly participate in such a case during their
employment); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.12(a) (Am. Bar Ass’n 2021) (restricting an
attorney’s participation in a case when that attorney participated personally and substantially in such
case during her clerkship).
65. Although this article focuses on the need for ethical rules to govern attorney behavior postclerkship, the time prior to a clerkship is even less regulated, and neither the Judiciary’s Code of
Conduct, nor any other authority offers guidance or purports to adequately govern this period.
Especially with the growing number of lawyers working in private or public practice prior to their
clerkship, there are countless situations one could envision that call for the exercise of ethical judgment
relating to one’s upcoming clerkship. See, e.g., CODE OF CONDUCT FOR JUDICIAL EMPLOYEES, supra
note 46, at 1 (“This Code of Conduct applies to all employees of the judicial branch, including interns,
externs, and other volunteer court employees . . . .”).
66. Even if we accept, at face value, the Clerk’s Handbook requirement that former clerks
continue to follow a duty of confidentiality and avoid conflicts of interest, there are other duties that
should continue. Just as current clerks are not permitted to leverage their position in the Judiciary for
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same sources described in the previous section: their state bar, their
continued respect for their judge, and the demands of maintaining a strong
professional reputation.
Now that the clerkship term has passed, it is safer to assume that a law
clerk is a member of a state bar. The judiciary, the judge, and the
United States are still not the clerk’s client (or former client), and Rules 8.4
and 1.12 remain the only directly applicable authorities.67 And while a state
bar might be more likely to investigate and sanction a practicing attorney
under those rules for abusing her former position in the judiciary,68 this
potential for increased oversight does little to offer guidance for complex
scenarios to former clerks.
The clerk’s continued respect and loyalty to the judge is now perhaps the
strongest force preventing unethical exploitation of the experience. Such a
basis for ethical responsibility is innately personal, and it is unwise to expect
all attorneys to practice equivalent judgment in balancing the interests of
their former employer with the interests of their current client. Attorneys
have financial incentives and a duty to zealously advocate for their clients,69
and a personal relationship to one’s judge should not be institutionally relied
upon as the bulwark against behavior that could benefit one’s client at the
expense of the judiciary. Lastly, the appendage conception of the clerk
breaks down entirely post-clerkship. How can an attorney representing a
client and appearing before the court in her own name remain an arm of the
judge?

personal gain, so too should former clerks be prevented from using their prior judicial position to their
improper personal advantage, for instance, promising access to one’s judge in exchange for personal
benefit. An example might be a law professor who previously clerked for a prominent judge promising
a clerkship recommendation to a law student mentee, but only if that student jumps through a series
of exploitive and inappropriate hoops.
67. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4 (governing an attorney’s misconduct); Id. at
R. 1.12(a) (prohibiting clerks from working on cases with which they had substantial involvement).
68. Id. at R. 8.4, 1.12(A) (governing violations of prejudicial conduct toward the administration
of justice and assisting a judge in a violation of judicial conduct).
69. For a discussion on the appropriate “zeal” with which attorneys should approach advocacy,
see, e.g., Paul C. Saunders, Whatever Happened to ‘Zealous Advocacy’?, 245 N.Y.L.J. 47, 47 (2011) (“There
are those like Sylvia Stevens, the assistant general counsel of the Oregon State Bar, who believe that
zealousness is ‘the highest manifestation of professionalism.’ Others like John Conlon, the managing
attorney for SAFECO Insurance Companies, believe that ‘zealous advocacy is not viewed so much as
an ethical responsibility as it is a weapon to use to club opponents.’” (footnote omitted)).
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A new duty does grow post-clerkship—the need to protect one’s name
and reputation as a practicing attorney.70 This reputational responsibility is
multifaceted, and attorneys cultivate different reputations depending on the
clients they represent.71 However, it befits any attorney who frequently
appears before the court to protect their reputation, at least in the eyes of
the judge, as ethical, responsible, and honest.72 The judge is more likely to
trust that arguments from an attorney of high standing are legally and
factually accurate. Former law clerks are valued by firms and clients in part
for their ability to bring an already trusted reputation before the judge,73
and this reputation is not something many clerks would readily jeopardize.
Still, as a profession we do not trust legal ethics to reputational incentives,
for a multitude of reasons, nor should we do so for former clerks.
This leaves the judiciary’s code of conduct and related authorities. The
formal advisory opinions associated with the code, and the code itself,
explicitly state the code only applies to “employees of the Judicial Branch,”
not former clerks,74 even if the Clerk’s Handbook and other advisory
opinions suggest post-clerkship obligations.75 The handbook’s call for
continuing ethical obligations seems to fit within the age-old conception of
a clerk as bound by an ethereal authority that unites the clerk and her judge.
70. See Fred C. Zacharias, Effects of Reputation on the Legal Profession, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 173,
173 (2008) (discussing the ways in which a lawyer’s reputation is pivotal in attracting clients);
Chantal Bechervaise, Why Does Reputation Matter So Much to Law Firms?, TAKE IT PERSONEL-LY
(June 19, 2016), https://takeitpersonelly.com/2016/06/19/why-does-reputation-matter-so-much-tolaw-firms/ [https://perma.cc/E5YL-5TRJ] (“Reputation is of the highest importance to attorneys,
because it drives a big portion of their demand among clients.”); Philip W. Thomas, Mississippi Judges
Stress the Importance of Professional Reputation, MS LITIG. REV. & COMMENT. (Sept. 2, 2014),
https://ww.mslitigationreview.com/2014/09/articles/general-1/mississippi-judges-stress-the-import
ance-of-professional-reputation/ [https://perma.cc/TM5S-53FJ] (providing comments regarding a
recurrent theme during interviews placing an importance on an attorney’s reputation with judges).
71. Zacharias, supra note 70, at 179 (“Just as there are various kinds of reputation, a single
reputation can have multiple effects.”).
72. See generally, Thomas, supra note 70 (“[T]reat your clients, your adversaries, your peers and
the court with respect and courtesy . . . and be honest and straightforward in your presentations to the
court.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
73. Garoupa & Ginsburg, supra note 26, at 229 (identifying important roles judicial reputation
plays on professional norms).
74. See supra text accompanying note 61; GUIDE TO JUDICIARY POL’Y, PUBLISHED ADVISORY
OPINIONS, supra note 49, at 124–26 (applying the Code of Conduct only to Judicial Branch employees,
not prospective or former employees, which would include former law clerks).
75. See GUIDE TO JUDICIARY POL’Y, PUBLISHED ADVISORY OPINIONS, supra note 49, at 213
(mandating judicial employees “should never disclose any confidential information” binding “clerks
even after their clerkships end[]”); see also FED. JUD. CTR., supra note 1, at 25 (“[Y]our ethical obligations
impose certain ongoing restrictions that follow you to the next step in your career.”).
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This conception, however, is inadequate to ensure the ethical behavior of
practicing attorneys.
III. WHY DO WE NEED A NEW FRAMEWORK?
A. Ensuring the Protection of Confidential Information
1.

A Continuing Ethical Obligation Post-Clerkship

A clerk’s ability to keep confidential judiciary information confidential is
just as important post-clerkship as it is during the clerkship. “Preserving the
confidentiality of judges’ work has been ‘an honored tradition among law
clerks[.]’”76 This confidentiality protects the sanctity of judicial decisions,
the appearance of impartiality, and maintains a fair playing field among
parties.77 While the duty is rigidly protected via a code of conduct during
one’s clerkship, after one’s clerkship loyalty and reputation seem to be the
chief enforcers of continued confidentiality. As one commentator lamented
nearly forty years-ago, in response to the publication of a book peering
inside the Supreme Court, “[t]his traditional secrecy recently was shattered
by the publication of The Brethren . . . . The authors of The Brethren asserted
that 170 former law clerks were among their anonymous sources and that
‘dozens of sources’ handed over conference notes, diaries, unpublished
opinion drafts, and internal memoranda between [Supreme Court]
Justices.”78 The commentator concluded that “[n]either the loyalty of clerks
nor the remedies usually provided under contractual or fiduciary theories
furnish sufficient assurance that confidential information will be
protected.”79 Books providing controversial insight to the judiciary, and
especially the Supreme Court, have only increased since the
1979 publication of The Brethren.80
76. Comment, supra note 14, at 1230 (quoting Wright, supra note 15).
77. See, e.g., CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES, supra note 22, at 11 (promoting
public confidence “when judges take appropriate action based on reliable information of likely
misconduct.”).
78. Comment, supra note 14, at 1230 (footnotes omitted) (quoting BOB WOODWARD & SCOTT
ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN: INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT 4 (1979)).
79. Id. at 1262.
80. See Joan Biskupic, Ex-Supreme Court Clerk’s Book Breaks the Silence, WASH. POST
(Mar. 4, 1998), https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/national/longterm/supcourt/stories/
wp030498.htm?noredirect=on [https://perma.cc/392Y-FFYU] (providing controversial insight into
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The Volume 129 editors of the University of Pennsylvania Law Review
proposed
a set of guidelines be adopted to govern the law clerk’s confidentiality duty,
with enforcement varying according to the type of information involved. . . .
The guidelines would be [enforced] by disciplinary action similar to that
currently used to enforce the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility. The
proposed guidelines, if adopted, thus would provide law clerks with a clear,
uniform idea of the scope of their confidentiality duty.81

Four decades later, I propose a similar solution for reasons including, but
more expansive than, a duty of confidentiality.
The reasons for continued clerkship confidentiality extend beyond
preventing improper insight into the judicial decision-making process. A
duty of confidentiality would work to prevent all manners of subversion and
exploitation of the judiciary. While Supreme Court tell-alls make for clearcut examples of a breach of confidentiality, much more insidious behavior
is possible. A particularly colorful example of an attempt at such subversion
comes from a Massachusetts disbarment proceeding, In re Crossen:82
Reduced to the bare essence, the facts are as follows: lawyers representing the
losing side in a very contentious, lengthy, and expensive dispute over control
of a supermarket empire pursued a scheme by which they hoped to get a new
trial. Convinced that the trial judge who presided over their case was
prejudiced against them, they hit upon what they believed was a way to expose
the judge through the former law clerk who had worked on the case. The
lawyers set up a false job interview for a “dream job[.]” The former law clerk
was initially lured to Nova Scotia, presumably because surreptitious taping was
not illegal there. In the course of the fake job interview, the interviewers
repeatedly tried to get the law clerk to reveal the extent of his responsibility
for drafting the decision in the case, and more importantly, that the judge had

the judiciary); see also Ronald Collins, New or Forthcoming Books on the Supreme Court, Including One by Justice
Stephen Breyer, SCOTUSBLOG (Aug. 10, 2015, 10:07 AM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2015/08/
new-or-forthcoming-books-on-the-supreme-court-including-one-by-justice-stephen-breyer/ [https://
perma.cc/36K3-RYH7] (listing “[e]ighteen new or forthcoming books” providing this insight);
Tony Mauro, New Book Tells Inside Stories of Feuding Justices, Anger Toward Trump, THE NAT’L L.J. (Sept. 4,
2018, 12:30 PM), https://www.law.com/nationallawjournal/2018/09/04/new-book-tells-insidestories-of-feuding-justices-anger-toward-trump/?slreturn=20190508131227 https://perma.cc/6YQJMVUP] (“telling behind-the-scenes stories about U.S. Supreme Court justices . . . .”).
81. Comment, supra note 14, at 1262.
82. In re Crossen, 880 N.E.2d 352 (Mass. 2008).
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decided the outcome of the case prior to hearing evidence. The job interview
ruse was continued several weeks later in New York City, essentially in an
effort to elicit more specific, and hopefully admissible, evidence of
prejudgment by the trial judge. Finally, when the results of the two fake job
interviews yielded less than the lawyers had hoped they would, a third
interview was arranged with the law clerk—this time in Boston—for the
purpose of “brac[ing]” the former law clerk. This included revealing that the
job offer was false and threatening to go public with information that would
be damaging to the former law clerk, unless the law clerk cooperated with the
lawyers by signing a statement that would more clearly support the claim of
the trial judge’s prejudgment. Instead, the former law clerk went to the FBI
and participated in a reverse sting that eventually resulted in the exposure of
the lawyers and bar discipline proceedings.83

The Massachusetts Bar found that the ruse ran “afoul of proscriptions on
lying, deceiving, and making misrepresentations.”84 However, the author
of the above passage commented that “courts should be concerned that
their former clerks, and apparently some lawyers, generally do not share this
understanding[]” that “ex parte contacts with law clerks and judges
generally, [are] clearly an impermissible interference with a judge-law clerk
confidential relationship that would be inconsistent with fundamental
principles governing the administration of justice.”85 Left unanswered is
whether discipline could be applied to the law clerk. If a lawyer asks a
former clerk for insider judiciary information for clearly improper purposes,
what could happen to the clerk if they willingly oblige?
There are many reasons why clerks make valuable attorneys; for one, law
firms value a clerk’s insight into the judicial decision-making processes. It
is striking that disciplinary rules do not appear to prevent a clerk from
disclosing confidential information during, for example, the above
fraudulent recruitment.86 It is possible that, in a situation where the clerk
83. Charles W. Sorenson, Jr., Are Law Clerks Fair Game? Invading Judicial Confidentiality, 43 VAL.
U.L. REV. 1, 2–3 (2008) (alteration in original) (footnotes omitted).
84. Id. at 3.
85. Id. at 4–5.
86. On the other hand, there might be circumstances under which a clerk should be permitted
to disclose confidential insight into judicial decision-making. For instance, what if they have good
reason to believe the judge is making a decision for improper reasons, such as an undisclosed conflict
of interest or bias? An interesting example is seen in a Minnesota criminal trial where affidavits from
the trial judge’s law clerks were employed by a party in the appeal process. See Peter N. Thompson,
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sold the information for a job offer or other monetary reward, it would
reflect poorly upon their fitness to practice as an attorney. Ultimately,
however, there may be limited enforceable duty to keep the information
confidential.87
Some disclosures by former clerks are likely harmless or even beneficial
to the fair administration of justice. Former clerks often advise their
superiors and their clients on the preferences of a judge, court, or circuit:
perhaps the judge strictly adheres to time constraints at hearings, is skeptical
of motions for summary judgment in bench trials, or finds grammatical
mistakes particularly noxious. Maybe a circuit frequently draws insight from
a different circuit for a particular area of law. Armed with this knowledge,
the former clerk can advocate on behalf of her client effectively and
efficiently. Rather than tainting the administration of justice, this insight
likely facilitates the efficient use of judicial resources.
We can, however, push this hypothetical into controversial territory.
Perhaps the judge confided to the clerk on a private occasion that she would
like to see the law move in a particular direction. The utilization of this
private musing feels much more like a confidential look inside the wheels of
justice than effective or fair advocacy. Then again, if that musing is
consistent with the judge’s public statements or dicta in prior cases then
maybe it could be ethically disclosed to one’s client. Continuing on this
path, what if the former clerk is aware the judge is expecting a child at the
end of the summer, and as a result, advises her firm to file a particularly
important motion in April rather than August? This also carries an air of
impropriety; the spreading of that information does not clearly benefit the
judicial process. At best, its disclosure prejudices the other party; at worst,
it weakens the integrity of the judiciary. In sum, the forces preventing a

Confidentiality in Chambers: Is Private Judicial Action the Public’s Business?, 62 BENCH & BAR 14, 16 (2005)
(“[The trial judge] told the law clerks that he had ‘denied defense counsel’s challenges for cause because
he was angry with them.’ . . . The Supreme Court never questioned the propriety of the judge’s law
clerks working with, or at least supplying affidavits to defense counsel revealing private
communications with the trial judge.”) (quoting Greer v. Minnesota, 673 N.W.2d 151, 154 (Minn.
2004)). The commentator goes on to describe how under-developed this area of the law is, with little
in the way of tangible law preventing the continued use of law clerk affidavits to undermine judicial
decisions. Id. at 17. He suggests seven possible solutions, including a clerk’s code of conduct, criminal
laws, a statutory privilege, a common law rule, an evidence rule, an ethics code development, or a
contractual confidentiality. Id. at 17–18. Today, Rule 1.12(a) might prohibit such law clerk affidavits
related to matter on which they worked, if such affidavits were used in the representation of a client.
87. See FED. CIR. R. 50 (restricting an attorney’s appearance before the court).
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clerk’s disclosure of this personal information are her loyalty to the judge
and respect for the judiciary.
2.

Providing Former Clerks Guidance

An ethics rule would not just prevent the disclosure of confidential
information; it would provide clerks with guidance on when they may, or
even should, disclose private happenings in chambers. As highlighted in the
prior section, there could be innumerable hypothetical situations where a
clerk or former clerk needs advice on whether information should be kept
confidential. The bar could serve a useful role by offering guidance to them
on the propriety of certain disclosures, beyond merely forbidding
participation in matters the clerk worked on in chambers.88
3.

An Ear to Turn to When Confidentiality No Longer Applies

The Clerk’s Handbook explicitly and repeatedly notes that the
confidentiality “obligation does not apply to misconduct, including sexual
or other harassment, by your judge or any person.”89 A robust, clear, and
supportive reporting system is important for law clerks, given the possibility
of abuse,90 and the judiciary has undergone significant efforts in recent years
88. See Stuart C. Gilman, Ethics Codes and Codes of Conduct as Tools for Promoting an Ethical and
Professional Public Service: Comparative Successes and Lessons, PREM 3 (2005), https://www.oecd.org/mena/
governance/35521418.pdf [https://perma.cc/99GN-NZK9] (“[C]odes carry general obligations and
admonitions, but they are far more than that. They often capture a vision of excellence, of what
individuals and societies should be striving for and what they can achieve. In this sense codes, which
are often mistaken as part of law or general statements of mere aspiration, are some of the most
important statements of civic expectation.”); see also id. at 7 (“Codes are not designed for ‘bad’ people,
but for the persons who want to act ethically.”).
89. FED. JUD. CTR., supra note 1, at 5.
90. See Alison Frankel, Breaking the Law Clerks’ Code of Silence: The Sexual Misconduct Claims Against
Judge Kozinski, REUTERS (Dec. 13, 2017, 3:57 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-otckozinski/breaking-the-law-clerks-code-of-silence-the-sexual-misconduct-claims-against-judge-kozins
ki-idUSKBN1E72YX [https://perma.cc/SHP4-GF5A] (discussing the sexual misconduct allegations
against Judge Kozinski and the challenges clerks face when reporting inappropriate conduct);
Dana Liebelson et. al., Law Clerks Say Federal Judiciary Isn’t Equipped to Handle Sexual Harassment,
HUFFPOST (Dec. 20, 2017, 8:47 PM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/federal-courtclerk-sexual-harassment-judges_us_5a3acf5ae4b025f99e1449f8
[https://perma.cc/6U5Z-EMJ8];
Staci Zaretsky, Federal Judge Allegedly Has Affair with Law Clerk, Goes to Jail over Domestic Violence Incident,
ABOVE THE L. (Aug. 12, 2014, 12:14 PM), https://abovethelaw.com/2014/08/federal-judgeallegedly-has-affair-with-law-clerk-goes-to-jail-over-domestic-violence-incident/ [https://perma.cc/
BMP4-HV95]. Compare Gertner, supra note 20, at 89–90 (describing the Equal Employment
Opportunity complaint process and acknowledging rules governing harassment are so vague they are

82

ST. MARY’S JOURNAL ON LEGAL MALPRACTICE & ETHICS

[Vol. 12:58

to fortify its mechanisms for handling both reporting and misconduct.91
This Article does not address the judiciary’s internal systems, but rather
suggests that a model professional rule on clerk and former clerk
confidentiality would provide important external guidance on what may be
fairly and ethically disclosed.
Accusing one’s superior of misconduct carries grave professional and
legal consequences, and a clerk may take comfort in external confirmation
of the ethics and professionalism of their actions. The bar has the capability
of offering advice on the ramifications of reporting information one’s judge
or former judge may not want publicized. State bar associations would, of
course, need to enter such a delicate arena with reserve and nuance. This
Article does not offer a specific proposal but envisions a committee of
members of the bar available for judiciary ethics questions, perhaps
consisting of former judges and clerks, as well as subject matter experts on
types of abuse that might be reported.
B. Reporting Violations and Policing Improper Conduct by Clerks
What happens when a clerk breaches the Code of Conduct for Judicial
Employees? Who reports the breach? The answer is, likely too often, no
one. If the breach is detected at all, it is likely by a party appearing before
the judge. Of course, the misconduct could also be detected by other
members of chambers, but it is not a robust policy to expect that friends
and colleagues of a clerk will readily suspect or report their unethical
behavior. In an informative example, the plaintiff in a high profile civil rape
case discovered that a law clerk “was sending text messages to [the
defendant’s] attorney, . . . [at] Zuckerman Spaeder (the firm where [the
clerk’s] father [was] also a partner), who she befriended over an unrelated
legal matter where he represented her pro bono.”92 Released text messages

virtually unavailable to employees and judges) with Coe, supra note 20 (discovering “a cultural
awakening and reckoning on” the issue of sexual harassment).
91. See Judicial Conference Approves Package of Workplace Conduct Reforms, U.S. CTS. (Mar. 12, 2019),
https://www.uscourts.gov/news/2019/03/12/judicial-conference-approves-package-workplace-con
duct-reforms [https://perma.cc/8FFR-C77X] (“The federal Judiciary’s national policy-making body
today approved a package of workplace conduct-related amendments stating the obligations of judges
and Judiciary employees to report reliable information likely to constitute misconduct; making clear
that confidentiality obligations should never be an obstacle to reporting judicial misconduct or
disability; and specifying that retaliation for disclosing misconduct is itself misconduct.”).
92. See Joe Patrice, Law Clerk Busted Getting Chummy with Lawyer Appearing Before the Court, ABOVE
THE L. (Oct. 22, 2015, 4:57 PM), https://abovethelaw.com/2015/10/law-clerk-busted-getting-
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stated “[y]ou’re going to owe me a beer, FYI,” and “[y]es, as of 3:34 today,
you owe me a beer (or wine!)[,]” with the trial judge having issued a key
decision at that exact moment.93 District Court Judge Reggie Walton for
the District of Columbia denied plaintiff’s motion for his recusal, writing:
“To be sure, the Court does not condone these comments even though they
were made in jest. There was no factual basis for them, and they should not
have been made. . . . [H]owever, the ill-advised conduct by the law clerk
provides no basis for the court to recuse itself,” and the court screened her
from working on it.94 After her clerkship ended, she became a trial lawyer
at the United States Justice Department.95
Conduct comparable to that law clerk by a practicing attorney could lead
to a state bar investigation, and it is worth noting she is not the first or only
clerk to find herself in the pages of a decision.96 In this case, the law clerk
faced very little consequence, beyond reputational damage. While she
undoubtedly disappointed her judge, his written opinion stated that her
actions were “in jest.”97 Section 3(B)(6) of the Code of Conduct for United
States Judges reads “[a] judge should take appropriate action upon receipt
of reliable information indicating the likelihood that a judge’s conduct
contravened this Code, that a judicial employee’s conduct contravened the
Code of Conduct for Judicial Employees, or that a lawyer violated
applicable rules of professional conduct.”98 This suggestion of a duty to
chummy-with-lawyer-appearing-before-the-court/?rf=1
[https://perma.cc/M6NT-TD4C]
(elucidating the circumstances and context surrounding the story).
93. Id.
94. Doe v. Cabrera, 134 F. Supp. 3d 439, 441–42 (D.D.C. 2015).
95. Debra Cassens Weiss, Law Clerk’s ‘Owe Me a Beer’ Text to Big Law Associate Leads to Review by
Federal Judge, A.B.A. J. (Oct. 22, 2015, 9:37 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/law_
clerks_owe_me_a_beer_text_to_biglaw_associate_leads_to_review_by_federa [https://perma.cc/K7
4R-89BZ].
96. See Parker B. Potter, Jr., Law Clerks Out of Context, 9 U.N.H.L. REV. 67, 68 (2010) (discussing
cases “in which law clerks have become sources of evidence in cases they were working on, as
producers of exhibits, as affiants, or as witnesses.”).
97. Her actions violated the Code of Conduct for Judicial Employees regardless of whether they
were serious or in jest because, at the very least, she created an appearance of bias. See, e.g., FED. JUD.
CTR., supra note 1, at 5 (imposing a strict obligation on law clerks to keep case-related matters
confidential).
98. CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES, supra note 22, at 7; see generally
Leslie W. Abramson, The Judge’s Ethical Duty to Report Misconduct by Other Judges and Lawyers and Its Effect
on Judicial Independence, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 751 (1997) (discussing judges’ duty to report other judges
and lawyers engaging in unprofessional conduct).
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report seems to include current law clerks, but the appropriate response is
unclear. In this example, Judge Walton publicly acknowledged the event99
and, in all likelihood, privately chastised the clerk. It is, however,
questionable whether any judge should bear responsibility for determining
the appropriate discipline in such a situation.
With a professional rule as guidance, a clerk could be considered a
potential lawyer whose professional misconduct warrants bar discipline.100
Under this conception, objective guidance and precedent would serve as a
helpful source of reference when dealing with misconduct. While judges
would still be in a position to take employment related action, a professional
rule will make ethical or professional determinations for a young lawyer,
rather than a judge with whom they have a personal relationship. As
mentioned, the relationship between judge and clerk can be lastingly close
which may make it difficult for a judge to consider the merits of a clerk’s
misconduct without bias.101 Additionally, lawyers appearing before the
judge would have the ability, and perhaps obligation, to report the clerk’s
conduct to the state bar,102 as opposed to having only the unpalatable
option of reporting a clerk to her judge. Much of the legal ethics landscape
is built on duties to report colleagues’ misconduct,103 thus the judiciary

99. Doe v. Cabrera, 134 F. Supp. 3d 439, 443–44 (D.D.C. 2015) (acknowledging the
indiscretion and providing steps for moving forward).
100. Whether the clerk is a lawyer may turn on whether they have been admitted into a state’s
bar association. See, e.g., David Lat, Elizabeth Wurtzel: Can She Call Herself a ‘Lawyer’ Without Having Passed
the Bar?, ABOVE THE L. (July 27, 2009, 4:00 PM), https://abovethelaw.com/2009/07/elizabethwurtzel-can-she-call-herself-a-lawyer-without-having-passed-the-bar/ [https://perma.cc/KRB2-CE
4U] (discussing how proclaiming oneself as a lawyer without being admitted to a bar in any state could
be a violation of the New York Judiciary Laws).
101. Some jurisdictions go so far as to prevent former clerks from appearing before their judge
for a designated amount of time post-clerkship. See ADVISORY COMM. ON JUD. CONDUCT OF THE
D.C. CTS, ADVISORY OPINION NO. 13: DISQUALIFICATION WHEN FORMER CLERKS APPEAR
BEFORE JUDGES (July 9, 2014) https://www.dccourts.gov/sites/default/files/divisionspdfs/
Disqualification-When-Former-Law-Clerks-Appear-Before-Judges-7-9-14.pdf [https://perma.cc/32
WH-TF7K] (noting “an appearance within a short period of time after the end of the clerkship could,
in some circumstances, cause a reasonable person to question a judge’s impartiality, and a waiting
period may alleviate this concern[,]” and suggesting “as a general rule of thumb . . law clerks should
not appear before the judges for whom they clerked within a year after the end of the clerkship”);
see also FED. CIR. R. 50 (restricting counsel from appearing when they are a former employee, including
for law school credit); 9TH CIR. R. 46-5 (prohibiting a former employee from participating “in any case
that was pending before the Court during the employee’s period of employment”).
102. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2021).
103. See id. (discussing a lawyer’s ethical duty to report misconduct of another lawyer or judge).
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would benefit from treating clerks more similarly to attorneys rather than
nonlegal judicial staff.
C. Drawing the Line Between Employer Rules and Attorney Ethics
The Clerk’s Handbook reads, “If you identify a potential ethics
problem,. . . . consult with your judge as soon as possible, even if your initial
investigation suggests a clear-cut answer. Individual judges or courts may
set standards that exceed the standards set by the Code and related rules and
opinions discussed above.”104 A code of ethics should consist of a single
set of rules with the same outcome for similarly situated individuals.105
These rules may admittedly vary based on jurisdiction but should not vary
with one’s superior. This does not mean that judges should lack the
authority to ask their clerks to follow chamber-specific rules, but these rules
should not be woven into the very fabric of clerkship ethics. Such a
framework feeds into the problematic conception of a clerk as an appendage
of their judge. A model professional rule on clerk behavior would clarify
the line between ethical rules and employer expectations.
1.

Post-Clerkship Recruiting

One particular area in need of uniform ethical treatment is law clerk
recruiting. As most federal clerkships are term limited, chambers often see
multiple clerks depart for private or public practice every year. The Clerk’s
Handbook reads:
First, a job search may create new conflicts of interest. Ask your judge if you
may apply for a job with a firm that represents a party currently before the
court. If you interviewed with a firm but have not accepted an offer, your
judge has discretion about whether you may work on matters involving the
104. FED. JUD. CTR., supra note 1, at 3; supra note 64 and accompanying text.
105. One commentator suggests,
[C]odes of ethics can function as a professional statement. That is[,] it expresses the public
service’s commitments to a specific set of moral standards. This has both cognitive and emotive
value. Cognitively it gives a person joining a profession, civil service, a clear set of value to which
they are expected to subscribe. Not all individuals are comfortable working as civil servants and
codes can clarify expectations. Codes can help provide the pride of belonging to a group or a
profession. Pride is a critical emotion in motivating individuals to see themselves as professional.
Gilman, supra note 88, at 9–10 (footnote omitted).
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firm. Once you have accepted an offer, however, the ethics rules take the
decision out of your judge’s hands. You may not work on any pending or
future cases involving your future employer.106

The pamphlet goes on to offer guidance on confidentiality, gifts or benefits,
and conflicts of interest.107 However, it concludes by, again, opening the
ethical rules to the discretion of the judge for post-clerkship appearances.108
In the context of recruiting, a model ethics rule is especially important for
defining what is ethically required and what is employer required. This
dividing line is missing from the current system and is especially important
because law firms and other recruiting organizations may be unaware of the
preferences of individual judges.109 This means that law firms may act
overcautious or unintentionally induce unethical behavior in recruiting
clerks, unaware that a judge or court has set boundaries exceeding the
judiciary’s floor. A bar rule would ensure that both clerks and law firms (or
other employers) behave ethically throughout the recruiting process, while
clerks may have to follow more restrictive guidelines based on the
preferences of the judiciary, the court, and the judge.110 Certain states have
begun issuing rules on this front, a trend the model rules committee should
consider.111

106. FED. JUD. CTR., supra note 1, at 24.
107. Id. at 25.
108. Id.; see supra note 64 and accompanying text. An interesting empirical study found that
certiorari petitions filed by former Supreme Court clerks were five times more likely to result in the
Court’s granting of certiorari. HUCHEN LIU & JONATHAN P. KASTELLEC, THE REVOLVING DOOR
IN JUDICIAL POLITICS: FORMER CLERKS AND AGENDA SETTING ON THE U.S. SUPREME COURT
17–18 (2021), https://scholar.princeton.edu/sites/default/files/clerks_cert_paper.pdf [https://
perma.cc/2D9R-JAM5]; see also Adam Liptak, Law Firms Pay Supreme Court Clerks $400,000 Bonuses.
What Are They Buying?, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 21, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/21/
us/politics/supreme-court-clerk-bonuses.html [https://perma.cc/Q7Q4-F2BE] (discussing a recent
study’s findings that “[f]ormer clerks were 16 percentage points more likely to attract the votes of the
justice for whom they had worked[,]” and noting that “[t]he relationship increased their chances of
obtaining their former boss’s vote to about 73 percent, from about 57 percent”).
109. Section 2.5-1 of the Judiciary Compendium provides additional guidance to clerks on
recruiting practices but is confidential to the Judiciary so not available to law firms. FED. JUD. CTR.,
supra note 1, at 26.
110. Many federal courts have individualized policies. See FED. JUD. CTR., supra note 1, at 16,
25, 30 (referring clerks to various policies covering online activities, examples of restrictions on
participation and appearance, and a number of possible limitations on careers).
111. See Cynthia Gray, Law Clerks’ and Future Employers, JUD. ETHICS & DISCIPLINE:
A BLOG OF THE CTR. FOR JUD. ETHICS OF THE NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE CTS. (Sept. 13, 2016), https://
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Partisan Behavior and Training

The judiciary prohibits clerks from “engaging in both partisan and
nonpartisan political activity” and asks that clerks “[e]xercise considerable
caution before engaging in activities with obvious political
overtones . . . .”112 The rules are stringent—“[y]ou should not even take
passive actions that might link you with a political issue, such as displaying
a political sign or bumper sticker”113—and for good reason. The
impartiality of the clerk reflects on the impartiality of the court. In this
digital age, there are infinite online ways a clerk could act, or appear to act,
political.114 On this front, the FJC guidance again cedes authority to the
court and judge.115
Judges and courts should be able to ask more of clerks than ethics
demand, but it is important to define what is ethically mandated and what is
employer mandated.116 An ethics baseline would also assist judges who

ncscjudicialethicsblog.org/2016/09/13/law-clerks-and-future-employers/ [https://perma.cc/CNH8GX7V] (describing Texas and Delaware rules governing certain aspects of law clerk recruitment, such
as the acceptance of bonuses).
112. FED. JUD. CTR., supra note 1, at 14.
113. Id.
114. Something as subtle as liking a Facebook post could reveal a clerk’s political opinion.
However, there must be a line between what is ethical and unethical. For example, a clerk should not
be ethically barred from using social media, even though social media companies collect data on the
subtlest acts, such as where you click and where your mouse lingers, all of which reveals political
preference. See Michael Grothaus, Facebook Confirms It Tracks Your Mouse Movements on the Screen, FAST
CO. (June 13, 2018), https://www.fastcompany.com/40584539/facebook-confirms-it-tracks-yourmouse-movements-on-the-screen [https://perma.cc/BB9S-HSDE] (illuminating the new method
which Facebook uses to track consumers).
115. See FED. JUD. CTR., supra note 1, at 16–17 (“Be sure to find out whether your court, your
judge, or both have policies that govern online activities during your clerkship, and [obtain] your judge’s
permission before participating in such activities. Also ask for your court’s policies regarding use of
government computers and computer services. You cannot exercise too much [caution] with online
activities.”); see generally Norman H. Meyer, Jr, Social Media and the Ethical Court Employee,
26 CT. MANAGER 5 (2012) https://nacmnet.org/sites/default/files/SocialMedia-and-the-EthicalCourt-Employee_NormMeyer.pdf [https://perma.cc/4S5Y-WJCK] (offering advice on how to
behave within the Code of Conduct for Court Professionals in a digital era).
116. See Elie Mystal, Obvious Important News for New Clerks, ABOVE THE L., (Sept. 17, 2008,
3:08 PM), https://abovethelaw.com/2008/09/obvious-important-news-for-new-clerks/ [https://
perma.cc/9E7J-ZYDG] (acknowledging the Clerk’s Handbook restrictions on political activities, and
determining that pasting an Obama bumper sticker would violate Canon Five of the Code of Conduct
for Judicial Employees).
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may lack the technological savvy to concretely advise their clerks.117
Additionally, the regulation of a clerk’s political speech is deeply entangled
with the First Amendment, and state bars are uniquely-well positioned to
track the First Amendment.118 There are practical obstacles and
reputational stakes associated with challenging the constitutionality of the
judiciary’s code of conduct,119 which lessen when challenging rules
promulgated by state bar associations.
An ethics rule governing political activity would also benefit the judiciary
by regulating pre-clerkship behavior. In recent years, politically motivated
organizations have offered pre-clerkship training programs. For example,
the Heritage Foundation offered a “training academy as a service to the
judiciary” with the goal of giving “incoming law clerks some of the tools
that they are unlikely to learn in law school and that will enable them to hit
117. See Robert Ambrogi, It Is Time to Extend the Duty of Tech Competence to Judges, ABOVE THE L.
(May 6, 2019, 3:47 PM), https://abovethelaw.com/2019/05/it-is-time-to-extend-the-duty-of-techcompetence-to-judges/?rf=1 [https://perma.cc/8QDV-MNBG] (discussing how judges often lack
technological competence).
118. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Intersection of Free Speech and the Legal Profession: Constraints on
Lawyers’ First Amendment Rights, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 569, 569 (1998) (discussing regular clashes
between state bars and the First Amendment, indicating their special position in regulating the speech
of court officials); see also Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 635 (1995) (upholding the
State Bar of Florida’s regulation of professional commercial speech); Peel v. Att’y Registration &
Disciplinary Comm’n of Ill., 496 U.S. 91, 110–11 (1990) (determining “the public censure of petitioner
for violating [the advertising rule] violates the First Amendment” and reversed a state supreme court’s
judgment); Shapero v. Ky. Bar Ass’n, 486 U.S. 466, 478–79 (1988) (permitting state bar’s regulation of
lawyers’ commercial speech, but rejecting its application to truthful and nondeceptive advertisements);
Zauderer v. Off. of Disciplinary Couns. of Sup. Ct. Of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 643 (1985) (indicating states
must tread carefully when interfering with dissemination of accurate information); Ohralik v. Ohio
State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 464 (1978) (identifying strong interest of states to regulate commercial
speech that harms the public).
119. Although there is an irony to members of the judiciary suing the judiciary, it is not unheard
of. See Zach Parker, Judge Sharon Marchman Sues Other Judges, Law Clerk in Federal Court, THE OUACHITA
CITIZEN (Apr. 19, 2016), http://www.hannapub.com/ouachitacitizen/news/local_state_headlines/
updated-judge-sharon-marchman-sues-other-judges-law-clerk-in/article_cecc1776-0670-11e6-9fe7-eb
41c01d3b9d.html [https://perma.cc/7ZP3-CHQ6] (discussing Judge Sharon Marchman suit against
four other judges and a law clerk); Robert Patrick, Lincoln County Clerk Sues Judges, Saying They Improperly
Stripped Her of Power, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (May 21, 2019), https://www.stltoday.com/news/
local/crime-and-courts/lincoln-county-clerk-sues-judges-saying-they-improperly-stripped-her/article
_865f7e90-c573-5da7-8298-b886741f84d4.html [https://perma.cc/NQY9-SLSV] (reporting a circuit
clerk’s suit “against three local judges and their colleagues” for prohibiting her from “hir[ing] and
fir[ing] her employees”); John Simerman, Orleans Court Clerk Sues Judge Byron C. Williams, Claiming
Sexual Harassment and Groping, THE NEW ORLEANS ADVOC. (July 13, 2018, 5:30 PM),
https://www.theadvocate.com/new_orleans/news/courts/article_88c87cde-86e7-11e8-8555-636849
73384b.html [https://perma.cc/7K52-5T7A] (reporting a clerk’s suit against her judge for sexual
misconduct).
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the ground running and excel[.]”120 The Heritage Foundation is historically
conservative, and some commentators alleged that it used its program to
indoctrinate clerks in conservative judicial values.121 A clerk’s involvement
in such a program could implicate the court’s appearance of impartiality. In
February 2019, the Judiciary Committee on Codes of Conduct responded
to potentially partisan training programs by issuing an advisory opinion
regarding when it is appropriate for judicial employees to attend educational
activities.122 A segment was directed to future law clerks specifically:
It is the Committee’s view that a judge has the discretion to instruct a future law
clerk regarding pre-employment educational opportunities that may have an
impact on the clerkship. A future law clerk should consult his or her
appointing authority for guidance. The appointing authority should recognize that
future law clerks are not fully subject to the Employees’ Code until they enter into service,
so care should be taken by the judge to ensure that a directive not to participate in
First Amendment protected activity be limited to the extent actually necessary to
protect the judiciary from the identified harm.123

This advisory opinion expressly acknowledges its limitations as applied to
prospective clerks. Although the Heritage Foundation academy was
“exclusively for attendees who, as of the dates of their respective
applications, have already accepted offers for federal clerkships with start
dates in 2019[,]”124 nothing prevented the organization from accepting law
120. Heritage Foundation to Host Federal Clerkship Training Academy, THE HERITAGE FOUND.
(Nov. 21, 2018), https://www.heritage.org/press/heritage-foundation-host-federal-clerkship-training
-academy [https://perma.cc/6JVK-3AME] (internal quotation marks omitted).
121. See Adam Liptak, Conservative Heritage Foundation Revives Training Academy for Judicial
Clerks, N.Y. Times (Nov. 21, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/21/us/politics/heritagefoundation-clerks-training-academy.html [https://perma.cc/K3MT-LLR2] (“The conservative legal
movement has worked hard to identify and cultivate promising law students and young lawyers, partly
to ensure a deep bench of potential judicial nominees.”); see also Todd C. Peppers, Invasion of the Clerkship
Snatchers? The Rise and Fall of the Federal Clerkship Training Academy, LAW.COM: NAT’L L.J. (Oct. 25, 2018,
12:22 PM), https://www.law.com/nationallawjournal/2018/10/25/invasion-of-the-clerkship-snatch
ers-the-rise-and-fall-of-the-federal-clerkship-training-academy/?slreturn=20190513151958 [https://
perma.cc/W6AX-3P37] (“[T]he cornerstone of this preparation would be teaching attendees originalist
and textualist judicial philosophies.”).
122. See GUIDE TO JUDICIARY POL’Y, PUBLISHED ADVISORY OPINIONS, supra note 49, at 243
(establishing the need for new rules governing judicial participation in educational programs).
123. Id. at 250 (emphasis added).
124. Heritage Foundation to Host Federal Clerkship Training Academy, supra note 120.
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students who applied but were yet to accept a clerkship. A model rule
governing political activity by clerks and future clerks could deter the
formation of politically motivated educational seminars by offering guidance
throughout their pre-, during-, and post-clerkship obligations. Such a rule
would not only reach the clerks, but the organizers and speakers at such
events. It would lessen the current burden on the judiciary to exert its
authority on future clerks.
IV. PROPOSAL: A COMPREHENSIVE BUT NON-INVASIVE MODEL RULE
GOVERNING CLERKS
A model professional rule of ethics governing law clerks would provide
clarity to the ethical obligations of clerks, give authority to pre- and postclerkship ethical duties, and add foundation to the complicated patchwork
of current rules. With state-by-state adoption of these rules, state and
federal clerks would be covered, as the Code of Conduct for
Judicial Employees applies only to federal employees. Certain states have
issued guidance for law clerks, but most rely on general employee rules
interpreted for clerks in a similar but less comprehensive way than the
Federal Judiciary.125
Clerks serve an important and unique role within our legal system, and
their ethical behavior protects the integrity of the judicial process. The
Federal Judiciary advises current clerks of their ethical responsibilities, but
it lacks sound authority to regulate former clerks; external guidance would
be immensely beneficial. The Code of Conduct for Judicial Employees and
Clerk’s Handbook should be interpreted as employer restrictions, which
leaves a vacuum for state bar associations to fill with true ethics rules. A
model rule for clerks would, at minimum, provide guidance on clerk’s
confidentiality, conflicts of interest, and partisan behavior. It would give
specific guidance for recruiting and interviewing, geared toward both the
law clerk and the recruiting entity. Lastly, the rule would be delicately and
125. For instance, New York “law clerks are subject to the [general] rules Governing Conduct
of Nonjudicial Court employees[,] . . . certain sections of the rules governing Judicial Conduct[,]” and
“the New York Code of Professional Responsibility” including reporting requirements for career
changes between public and private practice. Jeremy R. Feinberg, Law Clerk Ethics in New York State,
N.Y. LEGAL ETHICS REP. (Dec. 2007), http://www.newyorklegalethics.com/law-clerk-ethics-in-newyork-state/ [https://perma.cc/H2MM-L4PC]; see also MARYLAND JUDICIAL ETHICS COMMITTEE,
OPINION REQUEST NO. 2017-21: A JUDGE’S DISCLOSURE OBLIGATIONS REGARDING FORMER
LAW CLERKS 2−3 (2017), https://www.courts.state.md.us/sites/default/files/import/ethics/pdfs/
2017-21.pdf [https://perma.cc/5TCQ-MDEB] (interpreting Maryland’s judicial code of conduct to
determine when the judge must recuse himself when a former clerk appears before the court).
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narrowly worded, to avoid overstepping the authority of the judiciary and
the judge. Instead, it would lay out baseline expectations and fill the gaps in
the current structure.
V. CONCLUSION
The current ethics rules for law clerks are founded on temporary
contractual obligations, few post ethical obligations, and a flawed
conception of clerks as appendages of their judges.126 Respect and
admiration for one’s judge can and should be a cornerstone of one’s
clerkship. However, it does not follow that this respect should be
institutionalized as the basis of clerk ethics. Instead, both clerks and the
judiciary would benefit from a uniform professional code of conduct so that
clerks may have enduring guidance on the ways in which they should handle
the important, complex, and sensitive responsibilities with which they are
entrusted. “Codes are not designed for ‘bad’ people, but for the persons
who want to act ethically. The bad person will seldom follow a code, while
most people—especially public servants—welcome ethical guidance in
difficult or unclear situations.”127 Judges possess decades of professional
wisdom and are the subject of professional and public scrutiny, as well as
constitutional restrictions.128 By contrast, law clerks have little experience
and operate in relative anonymity;129 thus the manner in which we
promulgate ethics is integral to the success of law clerks.
Perhaps the strongest counterargument to this proposed rule is that bar
involvement would threaten the independence of the judiciary by
redundantly intruding into an already effective system.130 This Article’s
response is twofold: first, the most important purpose of such a rule is to
inform and guide post-clerkship activity, not to meddle in the discipline of
current clerks. Second, the rule’s purpose is narrow and cautious: to guide
the legal profession’s baseline expectations of these young, but influential,
126. See, e.g., FED. JUD. CTR., supra note 1 (governing a federal law clerk’s conduct).
127. Gilman, supra note 88, at 7.
128. MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT CANONS 1–4 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020); see also Sholes,
supra note 24, at 381 (“[T]he public has since developed the enlightened perception that judicial
behavior should reflect a judge’s position of considerable authority.”).
129. See generally FED. JUD. CTR., supra note 1 (addressing a federal law clerk’s conduct when
dealing with attorneys, the press, and online activities among other restrictions).
130. For example, rules governing a former law clerk’s practice may seem redundant. FED. CIR.
R. 50.
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attorneys. The symbolism of such a rule is in many ways more important
than actual disciplinary measures. This is because it will allow law clerks to
understand the distinction between their professional responsibilities and
their employer requirements. In sum, a well-thought-out rule of ethics for
law clerks would only strengthen and protect the integrity of the judiciary.

